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A famous result in expected utility theory states that a mean preserving spread of risky exogenous
future wealth leads to higher savings if the third derivative of the investor’s von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function is positive (see Leland, 1968, Sandmo, 1970, and Dr` eze and Modigliani, 1972). Utility
functions with this property thus reﬂect a speciﬁc precautionary savings motive and accordingly have
been coined as “prudent” (Kimball, 1990). Just like diﬀerent utility functions may show diﬀerent
degrees of risk aversion as indicated by the Arrow-Pratt measure, they may in a quite analogous way
also show diﬀerent degrees of absolute and relative prudence (see also Kimball, 1990, and the exposition
in Gollier, 2001). Whereas in some cases a globally higher degree of prudence will increase savings,
this assertion is not generally true (see, e.g., Menegatti, 2001, 2007, and Hau, 2002). In this paper we
further explore, in the framework of the standard two period model with identical utility functions in
both periods, how a higher degree of prudence aﬀects the optimal level of savings. The ﬁndings of our
analysis are ambiguous: If, through adequate combination of the exogenous interest rate and the pure
time discount rate, some equal treatment of the two periods is ensured, higher prudence will induce
higher savings. In other cases, the replacement of the utility functions typically has impacts on the
distribution of consumption over time such that, in addition, changes of risk aversion have to be taken
into account. If risk is low or the interest rate is high, the partial eﬀect brought about by a change
of risk aversion will dominate, and the change of prudence becomes irrelevant. Moreover, it can be
shown that in the more general case with diﬀerent utility functions in both periods, it cannot a priori
be expected that criteria based only on changes in prudence and risk aversion will generate clear-cut
eﬀects on savings behavior.
2 The Model
Consider the standard optimal savings model under uncertainty when there are two periods, which we
synonymously interpret as two subsequent generations.1 We ﬁrst assume that the utility function is
the same in the two periods 0 and 1, such that the objective function, i.e. the social welfare function
in the intergenerational case, is
u(w0 − s) + βEu( ˜ w1 + ρs). (1)
Here, w0 denotes the given certain wealth in the ﬁrst period, ˜ w1 is the uncertain wealth in the second
period and s is the endogenous amount of savings such that the (safe) consumption in the earlier
1With this interpretation, our results also have some relevance for the problem of intergenerational distribution which
is an important issue, e.g., in the current debate on global warming (see, e.g., Stern, 2006).
1period is c0 = w0−s and (risky) consumption in the latter period is c1 = ˜ w1+ρs. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function u(ci) (with i = 1,2) is assumed to be deﬁned on R+ and to be three times
continuously diﬀerentiable with u0 (ci) > 0, u00 (ci) < 0, and u000 (ci) > 0, i.e. it is strictly monotonically
increasing in consumption c, strictly concave, and prudent.
The marginal rate of transformation ρ between consumption in period 0 and 1 and the pure time
discount factor β are exogenously given by ρ = 1 + r and β = 1/(1 + δ) where r is the interest rate
and δ is the pure rate of time discount. We assume that maximizing (1) with respect to s yields an
interior solution s∗
u, which is characterized by the ﬁrst order condition
u0 (w0 − s∗
u) = βρEu0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u). (2)
An important role in our analysis is played by the “precautionary equivalent wealth level” ˆ w1 =
ˆ w1 (ρs∗
u,u, ˜ w1), which is deﬁned as the certainty-equivalent of the wealth distribution under optimal
savings s∗
u in period 1 when −u0 (c) is taken to be the utility function. Thus,
u0 ( ˆ w1) = Eu0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u). (3)
In general, the precautionary equivalent wealth level ˆ w1 is related to the well-known precautionary
equivalent premium ψ via ˆ w1 = E ˜ w1+ρs∗
u−ψ (ρs∗
u,u, ˜ w1) (see Kimball, 1990, and Gollier, 2001, 128).
The relation between ˆ w1 and consumption w0 − s∗
u in period 0 then crucially depends on the size
of βρ. In particular,




< 1 (= 1, > 1). (4)
This assertion follows as (2) and (3) imply
u0 ( ˆ w1) =




and u(c) is strictly concave.
We now analyze how optimal savings will change if the utility function u(c) is substituted by
another utility function v (c).
3 The Results
We assume that the new utility function v (c) has the same properties as the original utility function
u(c), i.e. that it is three times diﬀerentiable with v0 (c) > 0, v00 (c) < 0, and v000 (c) > 0. Furthermore,








2holds for all consumption levels c > 0. Hence, if v (c) is more prudent than u(c) according to (6), the
utility function −v0 (c) is more risk averse than the utility function −u0 (c). Together with the identity
in (3), a standard result concerning changes of Arrow-Pratt risk aversion (see, e.g., Gollier, 2001, 21)
then implies
v0 ( ˆ w1) < Ev0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u). (7)
This result can be used to show that in speciﬁc cases higher prudence will induce higher savings.
Proposition 1. If βρ is suﬃciently close to 1, more prudence implies higher savings.
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case βρ = 1. Then, ˆ w1 = w0 − s∗
u from (4) such that (7) gives
v0 (w0 − s∗
u) < Ev0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u). (8)
Starting from (8) with s = s∗
u, it is a straightforward implication of the concavity of v (c) that s has
to be increased to restore equality, i.e. to get
v0 (w0 − s∗
v) = Ev0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
v) (9)
as the ﬁrst order condition for optimal savings s∗
v with the new utility function v (c). Therefore, s∗
v > s∗
u
holds in the case βρ = 1 and then, from continuity, also if βρ is suﬃciently close to 1.
In general, however, higher prudence alone is not suﬃcient to provide unambiguous results on
an increase in optimal savings. Rather, additional assumptions on an accompanying change of risk
aversion are required. We then have two results on the change of optimal savings depending on whether
βρ < 1 or βρ > 1.
Proposition 2. If βρ < 1, higher prudence combined with higher risk aversion implies higher savings.





u0(c) holds for all c > 0, the ratio of marginal utilities
v0(c)
u0(c) is decreasing in c. Since, in the case
βρ < 1, (4) gives ˆ w1 < w0 − s∗
u, then
v0 (w0 − s∗
u)
v0 ( ˆ w1)
<
u0 (w0 − s∗
u)
u0 ( ˆ w1)
= βρ. (10)
From (10) and (7), i.e. higher prudence of v (c), we get
v0 (w0 − s∗
u) < βρEv0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u). (11)
A similar reasoning as at the end of the proof of Proposition 1 then shows s∗
v > s∗
u.
3Quite analogously, a result for the case βρ > 1 can be obtained.
Proposition 3. If βρ > 1, higher prudence combined with lower risk aversion implies higher savings.
Proof. If v(c) has a lower risk aversion than u(c),
v0(c)
u0(c) is increasing in c. Since in the case βρ > 1
we have ˆ w1 > w0 − s∗
u, condition (10) again holds. The proof then continues just like in the case of
Proposition 2.
We now want to provide some intuitive explanation for these results, which should make it more
transparent why savings behavior depends both on prudence and on risk aversion.
4 The Interaction of Changes in Prudence and Risk Aversion: An
Interpretation
For an interpretation of the results derived in the previous section, we start with the case βρ = 1 in
which β and ρ balance each other. Under the standard assumption that the economy is productive, i.e.
ρ > 1 holds, this advantage for the later generation is compensated by a positive pure time discount
rate δ > 0, i.e. β < 1, so as to avoid an unequal outcome and thus to ensure distributional neutrality.
This is a classical justiﬁcation for pure time preference that dates back to B¨ ohm-Bawerk (1883)(see
also, e.g., Arrow, 1999, and – clearly expressed but quite unnoticed – Rawls, 1972, 297-298). How
smoothing of consumption across the two generations is brought about by βρ = 1 is particularly
obvious in the special case when there is no wealth risk in the later period, i.e. if ˜ w1 is non random.
In this situation, βρ = 1 implies equal consumption levels for both generations. In the case where ˜ w1
is a random variable, the distributional balance between the two generations manifests itself in the
identity between consumption in period 0 and the size of the precautionary equivalent wealth level.
Then, as described by Proposition 1, the savings level is only aﬀected by changes in prudence since
eﬀects on intergenerational distribution are canceled out.
If, however, βρ 6= 1, things look quite diﬀerent because in this case, a change of the utility function
not only exerts an inﬂuence on precautionary savings, but also on the distribution of consumption
across generations. First, consider the case βρ < 1 in which the future generation is disadvantaged
through a discount rate δ that is higher than the interest rate r, i.e. β is smaller than ρ. In the bench-
mark case without wealth risk, the future generation then would have a lower level of consumption
than the present generation. With uncertainty in wealth ˜ w1 in period 1, the precautionary equivalent
4wealth level is lower than consumption in period 1, i.e. ˆ w1 < w0 − ρs∗
u. Now, higher prudence still
induces higher saving via the precautionary motive (as in the case βρ = 1) but, in addition, the eﬀects
on the intergenerational distribution that are implied by the replacement of the utility function have
to be taken into account, as well. Since higher saving corresponds to a more equal intergenerational
distribution in the case βρ < 1, the new utility function v(c) must be more risk averse in order to
ensure a higher level of optimal saving (see Proposition 2).2 In the other case with βρ > 1, it is
the future generation that is privileged by the underlying combination of β and ρ which is reﬂected
through ˆ w1 > w0−ρs∗
u. To generate higher savings in this situation, the intergenerational distribution
has to become less equal such that higher prudence must be combined with less risk aversion (see
Proposition 3).
Considering general risk averse utility functions, there is no systematic relationship between
changes of prudence and changes of risk aversion,3 which makes our results substantial. For spe-
ciﬁc classes of utility functions, however, increased prudence goes along with increased risk aversion
such that there are opposing eﬀects. Consider, as an example, the important case of isoelastic utility
functions for which the constant elasticity of marginal utility is denoted by η. Further assume that
the economy is productive, i.e. ρ > 1, and that there is no pure time discount such that utility in both
periods is given equal weight, i.e. β = 1. An increase in risk aversion η now leads to an increase in
the degree of relative prudence which is η + 1. Therefore, the negative impact on savings that then
results from higher risk aversion via the consumption smoothing eﬀect over time is counteracted by
the precautionary eﬀect that stems from higher prudence. This ambiguity has clearly been noted by
Dasgupta (2008) in his comment on Stern (2006).
If future wealth is certain, i.e. ˜ w1 = w1, only changes of risk aversion matter. Therefore, by
continuity, for any given u(c), β, and ρ with βρ < 1 and any utility function v (c) that is more risk
averse than u(c), there always exists, irrespective of the prudence of v (c), a random wealth distribution
˜ w1 with E ˜ w1 = w1 such that s∗
v > s∗
u. If βρ > 1, the analogous result hold for utility functions v (c)
that are less risk averse than u(c). In this case, more saving is also compatible with lower prudence if
future wealth is uncertain.
Concerning changes of prudence, another irrelevance result is obtained when, for given u, β, and
ρ, the condition
w0 − s∗
u ≤ w1 + ρs∗
u (12)
2For some hints at the importance of risk aversion in this context see Ventura (2007).
3See Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (1994) for examples of the independence and an analysis of some existing relationship
between changes of prudence and risk aversion. Additional results on this are in Maggi, Magnani, and Menegatti (2006).
5holds for s∗
u and w1 := min ˜ w1. Then, with optimal savings, wealth in period 1 in all states of the world
is at least as high as wealth in period 0. This clearly requires βρ > 1, and it is typically possible to
generate the situation described in (12) by only decreasing ρ strongly enough.4 Now, assume that u(c)
is replaced by any utility function v (c) that is less risk averse than u(c). Then, h(c) := v0 (c)/u0 (c) is
increasing in c, such that we get
v0 (w0 − s∗
u) = h(w0 − s∗
u)u0 (w0 − s∗
u) = Eh(w0 − s∗
u)u0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u)
< Eh( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u)u0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u) = Ev0 (w0 + ρs∗
u). (13)
By the standard argument already applied in the proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 it then follows
that s∗
v > s∗
u, independently of any assumption on the change in prudence. As we have started with a
general utility function u(c), these considerations also show that the potential irrelevance of changes
in prudence for changes in savings is not a remote possibility, but rather a generic phenomenon.
5 An Impossibility Result
We ﬁnally consider the general case where the utility functions in both periods are diﬀerent. By u0 (c0)
we denote the utility function in the earlier, and by u1 (c1) that in the later period. Under otherwise
unchanged assumptions, the objective function then becomes
u0 (w0 − s) + βEu1 ( ˜ w1 + ρs). (14)
We now show that, given u0 (c0), β, and ρ, it is not possible to characterize the class of period 1
utility functions v1 (c1) that induces higher savings than the original utility function u1 (c1) only by
referring to their (absolute) degrees of risk aversion and prudence. This impossibility result follows
from the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. Let u1 (c1) be replaced by some other utility function v1 (c1). Then, there always exists
a utility function ˜ v1 (c1) which everywhere has the same degree of risk aversion and prudence as v1(c1),
but induces a lower amount of savings than u1 (c1).
4To see this, let u
0 (c) > 0 for all c > 0. Now assume that ρs
∗
u < M < ∞ for all ρ > 0. Then, from concavity
Eu
0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs
∗
u) > Eu
0 ( ˜ w1 + M) > 0 for all ρ such that, for any β > 0, limρ→∞ βρEu
0 ( ˜ w1 + ρs
∗
u) = ∞. The supposed
boundedness of ρs
∗
u, however, implies limρ→∞ s
∗
u = 0, such that limρ→∞ u
0 (w0 − s
∗
u) = u
0 (w0) < ∞, which is not
compatible with the ﬁrst order condition (2). Thus, limρ→∞ (w1 + ρs
∗
u) = limρ→∞ ρs
∗
u = ∞. This implies that there
must exist a ˜ ρ such that w1 + ρs
∗
u > w0 > w0 − s
∗
u for all ρ > ˜ ρ.
6Proof. Deﬁne ˜ v1 (c1) as ˜ v1 (c1) := γv1 (c1) for some constant γ > 0. Thus, ˜ v1 (c1) clearly has the same














1 ( ˜ w1 + ρs∗
u) (15)
where s∗
u0,u1 denotes optimal savings under the original combination (u0 (c0),u1 (c1)) of utility func-
tions. Then, again by the standard argument described in the proof of Proposition 1, savings must
decrease when u1 (c1) is substituted by ˜ v1 (c1).
So we see that, because of a level eﬀect, it cannot be expected in the general case that changes of
risk aversion and/or prudence will provide sensible results on changes of savings behavior.
6 Conclusion
This paper has conﬁrmed that only in rather limited cases changes in the degree of prudence of utility
functions have unambiguous eﬀects on optimal saving in the standard two period model. Only when
there are identical utility functions in both periods and the underlying combination of the interest
rate and the pure discount rate approximately give rise to distributional neutrality across the two
periods, it is ensured that higher prudence induces higher savings. Otherwise, additional properties
of the utility functions also play an important role. With identical utility functions in both periods,
changes of risk aversion are also relevant when the intergenerational distribution is not balanced.
Then, distributional eﬀects that are not grasped by changing prudence but instead by changing risk
aversion as a separate determinant become relevant for the saving decision. In general it is, depending
on the given interest and pure time discount rate, well possible that the precautionary eﬀect and the
consumption smoothing eﬀect over time that result from a change of the utility function either support
or work against each other.
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